British nuclear jets programme costs ‘unrealistic’

The chair of the Government’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, has described the MoD’s cost forecast for the F-35 fighter jet programme as “unrealistic”.

The Committee – which scrutinises the financial accounts and holds the government to account for the delivery of public services’ – produced a report into the MoD’s management of its F-35 fighter jet programme, which will see Britain buy a total of 138 jets – likely to be 63 F-35B ‘stealth’ jets and 75 of the nuclear-capable F-35A fighter jets.

Despite Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s announcement in June at the NATO summit that Britain, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, would be expanding its nuclear capability through the purchase of 12 F-35A jets, the Committee’s report reveals the Ministry of Defence had little understanding of the implications – both technical or financial – of NATO integration of its nuclear-capable fighter jets when this announcement was made.

The report also shines a spotlight on the repeated and systematic failure of the MoD to demonstrate financial responsibility or accountability. Just as we’ve seen the ‘blank cheque’ approach to the spiralling costs of replacing Britain’s nuclear submarines, so we see it again here with Britain’s new nuclear-capable jets.

The Public Accounts Committee report states that the MoD ‘acknowledged that becoming certified for the NATO nuclear mission will add new requirements to training, personnel and possibly infrastructure.’ Yet, PAC reports that it was only once the Committee requested evidence about the F-35 programme that the MoD started discussions with ‘other partner nations’ to understand these requirements. Therefore ‘the Department [MoD] did not provide any indication of forecast costs.’

The MoD had argued that buying the F-35A nuclear-capable fighter jets would be 20% to 25% cheaper than the F-35B non-nuclear fighter jets. However, PAC’s report reveals that because the MoD had not familiarised itself with the technical implications of NATO integration before the decision was made to buy the F-35As, it had not allowed for additional costs associated with this. The report concludes ‘We believe it is a reasonable assumption that this may end up proving more expensive’.

This is the latest in a series of failures to forecast costs for the programme, resulting in substantially underestimating the scale of the spending needed. The initial cost projection by the MoD was set at £18.4 billion, which was only for the first 48 fighter jets – not the full 138 jets. It was then discovered that the MoD had failed to update this figure following the extension of the programme from 2048 to 2069 – more than a 20 year extension. The MoD then revised this figure to £57 billion but did not include any of the far more costly sustainment expenditure such as personnel, infrastructure or fuel.

The National Audit Office calculates the full programme is likely to be £71 billion. However, this does not take into consideration the additional costs associated with the certification of the F-35A jets for NATO nuclear missions, so this figure will certainly increase. And there are still further questions about the purchases of an additional 63 F-35A jets, as whether these will also be part of NATO’s nuclear mission.

The committee also reveals the level of chaos, mis-manageable and lack of planning of the programme. For instance, the MoD underestimated the number of engineers it would need for the programme, failing to consider annual leave and staff working in other roles. Consequently staffing costs have had to be increased by 20%.

A delay in upgrading the accommodation at RAF Marham, which has been the main operating base for the F-35s since 2013, means not all the accommodation will be ready in time for the 2029 delivery of the new F-35A fighter jets, likely causing delays and further costs in the programme.

This mismanagement, lack of financial accountability resulting in spiralling costs is typical of Britain’s nuclear weapons industry. The replacement of Britain’s nuclear submarines has been repeatedly rated ‘unachievable’ by the government’s Infrastructure and Projects Authority, due to cost overruns and delays.

Instead of pouring hundreds of billions more into this black hole of deadly weaponry – tying Britain even closer to NATO and Trump’s reckless nuclear war drive – the British government should redirect these funds to kick-start the British economy investing in transport, housing and healthcare, improving living standards and tackling the real threats we face from climate breakdown.