Speech by Reiner Braun, International Peace Bureau

I would like to address a specific and independent aspect of the discussion about the European bomb: Germany’s access to the bomb.

This has both a historical and a current reference.

In 1955/1956, parallel to the stationing of US nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany, a debate about Germany’s own nuclear weapons was initiated by Defence Minister Strauß. In a press release in April 1957, the Federal Chancellor declared these tactical nuclear weapons to be ‘special normal weapons’ that West Germany should also have at its disposal. The Federal Government actively campaigned in favour of German nuclear weapons.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer once called them ‘nothing more than a further development of artillery’.

There was a public outcry. The most outstanding sign, alongside many mass demonstrations, was the Göttingen Declaration with Nobel Prize winners Hahn, Born and Heisenberg as well as Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (not entirely altruistically, as they saw nuclear weapons as jeopardizing their ambitious plans for so-called civilian use).

The nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr was prevented. What emerged was nuclear sharing, which I don’t need to explain any further here.

In all these decades – despite signing the NPT treaty (which only applies to a limited extent according to the Bundestag’s decision, no longer in the event of war or crisis) – the back door of Germany’s own access was kept open even at the time of signing.

This discussion about Germany’s own bomb has picked up speed again since 2017 with the intensification of the confrontation with Russia and in connection with the intensification of the debate about the European nuclear weapon and in view of the probable election of Trump as US President.

It is no coincidence that it is leading German politicians who are driving the debate on European nuclear weapons forward on a massive scale:
• Former Foreign Minister Fischer: ‘The EU needs its own nuclear deterrent,’ says Fischer. The world has changed.
• Kiesewetter MdB, Colonel (ret.), CDU Foreign Policy: ‘This (the European and German bomb) is not yet up for debate, but there must not be any prohibitions on thinking. If the United States of America, as Trump has indicated, wants to make the Europeans pay more for their security, or even withdraw from Europe, there must be no bans on thinking and we must then approach France and Great Britain very strongly. We do not need any additional nuclear powers in Europe. How Europe can then be protected, as I said, there must be no zones of different security, but that is not yet up for debate, but there must also be no bans on thinking.’
• Jarosław Kaczyński: the German bomb – the European nuclear power in an FAZ interview

There is always an obvious ulterior motive behind all these statements: European nuclear weapons mean that Germany, Europe’s strongest political, economic and increasingly also military power, will thus gain influence over nuclear weapons in Europe that goes far beyond NATO’s nuclear planning group.

The discussion about the German bomb (within the framework of Europe) or independently is being fueled in particular by:
• conservative politicians (for whom the nuclear bomb is part of national sovereignty and who voted against ratification of the NPT treaty)
• conservative leading scientists
• think tanks associated with them
• Leading media

And is repeatedly put on the political agenda:
• die Zeit: Does Germany need its own nuclear weapons, May 2017, or the very latest 30 April 2024, in the FAZ or Panorama programme of 2 February 2017, with an audience of millions!
• Kiesewetter MdB Thinking the unthinkable and various similar things
• Münkler The political scientist Herfried Münkler agreed: ‘We need a common suitcase with a red button that travels between large EU countries’, including Germany, foreign policy strategy experts (Halle)
• Foreign Affaires 2017 and again and again, German Security Academy, German Council on Foreign Relations and Carnagie Foundation for International Peace

Recently, German social democratic politicians have also been taking part in this debate, whereby – to repeat – German access is often shamefully hidden behind the ‘European bomb’ for fear of excessive protests, knowing that if there is a European bomb, this means German access or if this does not exist for reasons of national sovereignty, the more intensive discussion about the German bomb will be easier/less conflictual in future.

EU Parliament President Katharina Barley (SPD) recently told the ‘Tagesspiegel’ that the EU’s own nuclear bombs could be helpful on the way to a common European defence policy.

Nobody from the front row of German politics: it is a taboo subject, highly controversial nationally and internationally with the prospect of further ruining Germany’s reputation as far as possible in connection with peace.

Clear sign that the old dream of a German bomb has not been abandoned are:
• Lingen fuel element factory with highly enriched uranium
• Gronau Uranium Enrichment plant Uranium 235
• So-called research reactor in Garching near Munich works with HEU highly enriched uranium and thus weapons-grade uranium, although it was switched to LEU low-enriched uranium in 2010 , restarted with HEU in 2014 after overhaul

Germany has withdrawn from nuclear energy, all nuclear power plants are closed, but these two nuclear factories and the research reactor continue to produce or work cheerfully and are even being expanded.

The door is open, technologically possible quickly!

So there is a clear need for a public debate to raise awareness and protest.

Therefore, the nuclear factories must be closed, Germany must end nuclear sharing and US nuclear weapons must be withdrawn, as necessities to finally sign the TPNW as well.