CND Vice-Chair Carol Turner outlines the current situation in regards to discussions on Iran’s nuclear programme.
A nuclear weapons free zone across the Middle East will be foundational in ensuring a long-term, stable peace in the region – a goal which seems far away just now. Israel has expanded its military action into Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Houthi-held ports in Yemen, whilst continuing its war on Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
As every CNDer knows, Israel does not admit to having nuclear weapons and has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the last 18 months, few parliamentarians have even raised the prospect of Israel using them. In contrast, Iran signed the NPT in 1968, ratified it in 1970, and remains a signatory to this day despite ongoing upheavals across the region.
Iran is the only other country in the Middle East with the potential to become a nuclear weapons state in the foreseeable future. Its cooperation is essential if any practical steps towards a nuclear weapons free Middle East are to be taken.
That’s why the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated by Barak Obama during his presidency, was one of the most important – and successful – arms limitation agreements of recent times. It came into effect when UN Security Council Resolution 2231 was adopted on 18 October 2015, and remains in force until 18 October this year – formally speaking if not in reality.
In return for some international sanctions being lifted, Iran agreed to:
• restrict uranium enrichment;
• limit the numbers and types of centrifuges in operation;
• cut the size of its of enriched uranium stockpiles; and
• permit inspection by the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Regular IAEA inspections confirmed the agreement was honoured. IAEA reports were accepted by all parties, including US government bodies. Trump was wrong and short sighted to pull out of the JCPOA during his first term. His approach to negotiating a new agreement in his second term shows signs of being just as wrong-headed and short sighted.
When the US withdrew in 2018, the US reimposed unilateral sanctions. Britain, France, and Germany (the E3) remain parties to UNSC 2231, but followed the US in slapping national sanctions on Iran – effectively killing the JCPOA.
US approach under Trump
Since returning to the White House, Trump has introduced more sanctions on Iran and suggested that military strikes by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites if he doesn’t get his way. Trump’s stated aims are that Iran must:
• give up its uranium enrichment programme,
• relinquish its civil nuclear power programme,
• cease to develop missile defences, and
• forego relations with entities such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.
These demands break with the bipartisan stance of previous Republican and Democratic presidents. To date, the focus has been on preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, without the linkage Trump is insisting on.
Iran’s approach
Throughout, Iran has sought to reopen a nuclear dialogue with the US. The Iranian leadership called for talks during Trump’s election campaign, after his victory, and again when he took office.
There is, however, broad concern that US withdrawal from the nuclear deal has prompted Iran to disregard some of the constraints imposed by the JCPOA. It is widely reported that Iran is now closer to acquiring weapons grade uranium – though estimates vary wildly, from five years or more to a matter of months.
With the JCPOA out the window, and Israel’s military aggression spreading across the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear hawks have increased their call for the country to acquire nuclear weapons. They wrongly believe this will deter rather than encourage attacks by US allies.
This pressure has coincided with public demands for democratisation. Opposition to the government has also surfaced as a result of Iran’s economic difficulties – a combination of the impact of sanctions and the international cost of living crisis.
US-Iran talks
Against this background, talks between the US and Iran began in early March, hosted by Qatar on behalf of the Gulf States. After a third round, it has been announced that the US and Iran have agreed to draw up a framework for further discussions.
It’s too early to say where talks might lead, but the path to a successful agreement remains fraught. A few days before the third meeting, US Secretary of State Mark Rubio said that Iran could not be allowed to enrich uranium, only import it for a civil nuclear programme. This suggests the US is sticking to its tougher demands.
Washington has targeted Iranian oil exports with the objective of reducing them to zero, by imposing sanctions on Iranian liquified petroleum gas. A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry responded to increased sanctions and Rubio’s statement saying it showed a ‘lack of goodwill and seriousness’ about talks.
There have also been developments in respect of China and Russia. The three met in March and issued a joint statement which emphasised:
• Iran’s right to civil nuclear power as a signatory to the NPT,
• upholding the NPT, ‘as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime’,
• support for UNSC Resolution 2231,
• the removal of unlawful unilateral sanctions on Iran, and
• restraint rather than escalation.
President Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty in January which was ratified by the Russian Duma at the beginning of April. It includes closer military and energy cooperation and joint military exercises, as well as a commitment to work together on building civil nuclear power stations.
Nuclear free future
US-Iran talks are decisive to the future of the region, both for the possibility of dialling down military escalation in the short term, as well as taking the first steps on the long road to denuclearising the region over time.
The support of Iran is an indispensable step on the way to a peaceful and nuclear weapons free Middle East.